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ABSTRACT
When the death penalty was declared unconstitutional in South Africa, 
the government enacted the Criminal Law Amendment Act in 1997 which, 
amongst other things, stipulated that a person convicted of some of the 
scheduled offences was to be sentenced to life imprisonment unless there 
were substantial and compelling circumstances. Many courts interpreted sub-
stantial and compelling circumstances in many different, and at times confus-
ing, ways. The Supreme Court of Appeal clarified the meaning of substantial 
and compelling circumstance in the well-known Malgas case in which it 
held, inter alia, that courts should not lightly depart from imposing severe 
sentences, since the legislature had singled out the scheduled offences to be 
punished severely because they are serious offences. One of the criteria the 
Court set was that courts should not rely on ‘speculative hypotheses favour-
able to the offender’ to avoid imposing life sentences. However, recently, 
in the Nkomo case, the Court held that the prospect of rehabilitation of the 
offender is a substantial and compelling circumstance to justify the imposi-
tion of a lesser sentence. This article analyses rehabilitation as an objec-
tive of punishment and highlights the likely challenges associated with the 
approach the Court seems to be adopting.
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1. Introduction
When the death penalty was declared unconstitutional in the well-known 
Constitutional Court decision of S v Makwanyane,1 the government 
reacted by introducing the Criminal Law Amendment Act (CLA) which, 
amongst other things, provided that a person found guilty of some of 
the scheduled offences, in particular of the offences under Part 1 of 
Schedule , was to be sentenced to imprisonment for life unless there 
were substantial and compelling circumstances. The CLA did not define 
what amounted to substantial and compelling circumstances. Various 
courts gave it differing and confusing interpretations until the matter was 
‘finally’ settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Malgas, which 
was approved by the Constitutional Court in S v Dodo. I put ‘finally’ in 
quotation marks because the recent decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in S v Nkomo, which is the subject matter of this article, attests 
to the fact that until today, almost seven years since the Supreme Court 
of Appeal laid down the criteria that courts should follow to determine 
what amounts to substantial and compelling circumstances, the bounda-
ries seemed to be shifting. It is possible that one could argue that the 
criteria set in S v Malgas are either being disregarded in some respects 
by the same court that set them or being modified to suit the realities of 
the situation. This note looks at three issues in relation to the CLA: the 
impact of the CLA on the South African criminal justice system; the new 
criterion of the ‘prospect of rehabilitation’ as a substantial and compelling 
circumstance; and the challenges facing rehabilitation as an objective of 
punishment. I argue that if rehabilitation is to be entrenched in South 
African criminal law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Appeal needs 
to define the standards to be used in determining whether persons are 
capable of rehabilitation if that is a factor determining the imposition of 
life imprisonment.
2.  CLA and the realities of the situation from the life 
imprisonment perspective
The history of the CLA has been sufficiently dealt with elsewhere and 
thus it is beyond the scope of this article. However, what should be 
1 S v Makwanyane 199 () SA 91 (CC).
 Act 10 of 1997.
 S v Malgas 001 () SA 1 (SCA).
 S v Dodo 001 (1) SACR 9 (CC).
 S v Nkomo 007 () SACR 198 (SCA).
 See M O’Donovan and J Redpath The impact of minimum sentencing in South Africa 
(00) 10-1; NJ Kubista ‘Substantial and compelling circumstances: Sentencing of 
rapists under the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Scheme’ (00)1 South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 77-8.
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mentioned is that research has proved that the CLA has had some 
negative effects on the South African criminal justice system, at least 
from two angles: administration and the prison population. Two recent 
studies commissioned by the Open Society Foundation of South 
Africa are used to illustrate this point. In one study, titled The Impact 
of Minimum Sentencing in South Africa,7 the researchers illustrate 
that the CLA has led to overcrowding of prisons; it has led to delays 
and backlogs, ‘some of which are linked to the referral of cases from 
regional to high courts.’8 Furthermore, victimization has also been 
identified as one of the problems associated with the CLA. Some of the 
above problems prompted the government to enact the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Amendment Act9 which, amongst other things, increases 
the jurisdiction of the regional courts by empowering them to sentence 
offenders to life imprisonment10 and ensures that people sentenced 
to life imprisonment have an automatic right of appeal to the High 
Court.11 The Memorandum on the Objects of the Criminal Law (Sen-
tencing) Amendment Bill suggested that the Act’s aims in giving the 
regional courts jurisdiction to impose life sentences are
‘to expedite the finalisation of serious criminal cases...and to avoid second-
ary victimisation of complainants, which, inter alia, occurs when vulnerable 
witnesses have to repeat their testimony in more than one court.’1
Another study, titled The effect of sentencing on the size of the South 
African population,1 vividly illustrates, as the title suggests, the effect 
the CLA has had on the prison population of South Africa and, in 
particular, on prisoners serving life sentences. The researchers il-
lustrate that by January 199 South Africa had  prisoners serving 
life sentences, and that by January 00 the number had increased 
to ,7.1 Thus, between January 199 and January 00, there was 
an increase of 1,197 percent in the number of prisoners serving life 
sentences.1 According to the official statistics provided by the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services, at the end of November 007 South 
7 O’Donovan and Redpath op cit (n) 77-8.
8 O’Donovan and Redpath op cit (n) 8.
9 Act 8 of 007.
10 Section 1 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act that amended s 1(1)(a) and (b) of the 
CLA.
11 Section  of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act, amending s 09 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.
1 See the Memorandum on the objects of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment 
Bill, Object .1. 
1 C Giffard and L Muntingh The effect of sentencing on the size of South African Prison 
population (00). 
1 Giffard and Munting op cit (n1) 10.
1 Ibid.
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African prisons were home to 7,79 prisoners serving life sentences.1 
What is clear from the Nkomo case is that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
is relaxing the criteria set in the Malgas case to ensure that only those 
who ‘deserve’ life sentences get them. It has done so by invoking the 
prospect of rehabilitation as one of the substantial and compelling 
circumstances.
3. S v Nkomo
3.1. Facts
The appellant was convicted in the regional court of rape and kidnap-
ping. The complainant testified that she was at the bar drinking a cold 
drink, given to her by the appellant, which he had laced with alcohol. 
The appellant forced her into a hotel room that he had hired, forced 
her to undress and raped her. The appellant locked her in the room and 
went back to the bar for more drinks. She attempted to escape from the 
room by jumping out of a window, fell some ten metres to the ground 
and injured her leg. Unfortunately, where she fell was where the appel-
lant had been sitting and drinking. He forced her back into the hotel 
room and raped her four more times during the course of the night. He 
also forced her to perform oral sex on him and slapped her, pushed her 
and kicked her. He prevented her from leaving the room again by taking 
her clothes away. When the complainant managed to escape the follow-
ing morning, she went straight away to the police station. The appellant 
was arrested and charged. The regional court sentenced him to a three 
year sentence on the kidnapping charge and referred him to the High 
Court for sentence on the charge of rape. The High Court did not find 
any substantial and compelling circumstances and sentenced the appel-
lant to life imprisonment in terms of s 1(1) of the CLA.17 The appellant 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the sentence.
3.2 Finding
The Supreme Court of Appeal (the majority) allowed the appellant’s 
appeal and replaced the sentence of life imprisonment with that of 1 
years imprisonment. Most importantly, the Court observed that
‘[t]he factors that weigh in the appellant’s favour are that he was relatively 
young at the time of the rapes [he was 9 when he raped the complainant], he 
was employed, and that there may have been a chance of rehabilitation.’18
1 Available at http://www.dcs.gov.za/WebStatistics/ accessed on 1 February 008.
17 Criminal Law Amendment Act 10 of 1997.
18 S v Nkomo supra (n) at para 1.
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Theron AJA dissented and held, amongst other things, that ‘[t]here is 
hardly any person of whom it can be said that there is no prospect 
of rehabilitation.’19 Theron AJA held further that she could not agree 
that the prospect of rehabilitation, of which there was no evidence, 
was a substantial and compelling circumstance ‘within the meaning of 
that expression and [is] truly [a] convincing reason for departing from 
the minimum sentence ordained by the Legislature.’0 Whereas the 
majority seemed to think that the prospect of rehabilitation amounted 
to a substantial and compelling circumstance, the minority did not 
agree. The question that one asks is: how does one determine what 
amounts to substantial and compelling circumstances? As mentioned 
earlier, when the CLA came into force different courts devised different 
interpretations of what amounted to substantial and compelling cir-
cumstances until the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Malgas decision 
laid down the criteria that should be used to determine what constitute 
substantial and compelling circumstances.
4. The Malgas criteria
The Supreme Court of Appeal in the Malgas case, in the now famous para-
graph , set the following as the criteria that should be used by courts in 
determining whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances.
‘A  Section 1 has limited but not eliminated the courts’ discretion in impos-
ing sentence in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule  
(or imprisonment for other specified periods for offences listed in other 
parts of Schedule ).
B  Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious 
that the legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or the particular 
prescribed period of imprisonment) as the sentence that should ordina-
rily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the listed 
crimes in the specified circumstances.
C  Unless there are, and can be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a dif-
ferent response, the crimes in question are therefore required to elicit a 
severe, standardised and consistent response from the courts.
D  The specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for 
flimsy reasons. Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue 
sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to 
the efficacy of the policy underlying the legislation, and marginal dif-
ferences in personal circumstances or degrees of participation between 
co-offenders are to be excluded.
E  The legislature has however deliberately left it to the courts to decide 
whether the circumstances of any particular case call for a departure 
from the prescribed sentence. While the emphasis has shifted to the 
19 S v Nkomo supra (n) at para 0.
0 S v Nkomo supra (n) para 1.
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objective gravity of the type of crime and the need for effective sanc-
tions against it, this does not mean that all other considerations are to 
be ignored.
F  All factors (other than those set out in D above) traditionally taken into 
account in sentencing (whether or not they diminish moral guilt) thus 
continue to play a role; none is excluded at the outset from considera-
tion in the sentencing process.
G  The ultimate impact of all the circumstances relevant to sentencing must 
be measured against the composite yardstick (“substantial and compel-
ling”) and must be such as cumulatively justify a departure from the 
standardised response that the legislature has ordained.
H  In applying the statutory provisions, it is inappropriately constricting to 
use the concepts developed in dealing with appeals against sentence as 
the sole criterion.
I  If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the par-
ticular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust 
in that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the 
needs of society, so that an injustice would be done by imposing that 
sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence.
J  In so doing, account must be taken of the fact that crime of that par-
ticular kind has been singled out for severe punishment and that the 
sentence to be imposed in lieu of the prescribed sentence should be 
assessed paying due regard to the bench mark which the legislature has 
provided.’
4.1. Analysing Nkomo in the light of Malgas
The language of the Malgas case is very instructive. Courts have to 
make sure that those who have been found guilty of committing the 
scheduled offences are punished severely in order to reflect the inten-
tion of the legislature in enacting the CLA, unless there are substantial 
and compelling circumstances. This explains why the Court says that 
‘the specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for 
flimsy reasons. Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, 
undue sympathy... are to be excluded’ and that
‘courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that 
the legislature has ordained life imprisonment... as the sentence that should 
ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the 
listed crimes in the specified circumstances.’
One needs to answer the question whether the prospect of rehabilita-
tion as a substantial and compelling circumstance does not fall within 
the ambit of what the Supreme Court of Appeal termed ‘speculative hy-
potheses favourable to the offender’ and ‘undue sympathy.’ To answer 
this question, I discuss rehabilitation as an objective of punishment.
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4.2 Rehabilitation as an objective of punishment
There are three major traditional objectives of punishment: retribution; 
deterrence; and rehabilitation. There is evidence that reconciliation1 
and restorative justice are also increasingly being mainstreamed as 
1 It has been argued that if the objective of punishment is reconciliation, then capital 
punishment cannot be considered to be punishment, because it makes it impossible 
for the offender and the victim to reconcile. See RA Duff, ‘The Intrusion of Mercy’ 
(007)  Ohio St J Crim L 8. Drumbl observes that the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda to a lesser extent, has considered reconciliation also to be an objec-
tive of punishment. See MA DrumbI ‘The ICTR and Justice for Rwandan Women’ 
(00) 1 New Eng J Int’l & Comp L108. After the 199 genocide in Rwanda the gov-
ernment established Gacaca courts with the hope that such courts ‘can strike the bal-
ance between punishment and reconciliation…’ See J Raper ‘The Gacaca Experiment: 
Rwanda’s restorative dispute resolution response to the 199 Genocide’ (00)  Pepp 
Disp Resol L J . For the countries where reconciliation has been used, see J Sarkin 
and E Daly ‘Too many questions, too few answers: Reconciliation in transitional socie-
ties’ (00)  Colum Hum Rts L Rev 1-.
 A definition and some examples of restorative justice have been given: ‘Restora-
tive justice is a theory of justice that emphasizes repairing the harm caused or 
revealed by the criminal behavior. It is generally accomplished through cooperative 
processes that include all stakeholders, hence its possible classification as a form 
of ADR. Some of the programs and customs typically identified with restorative 
justice include: victim-offender mediation, conferencing, circles, victim assistance, 
ex-offender assistance, restitution, and community service.’ See J Zeleznikow and A 
Vincent ‘Providing decision support for negotiation: The need for adding notions of 
fairness to those of interests’ (007) 8 U Tol L Rev 107. It has been demonstrated 
that restorative justice is one of the important elements in the South African crimi-
nal justice system because it embodies important elements, such as an apology and 
ubuntu, which restore the dignity of both the perpetrator and victim. See JL Gibson, 
‘Truth, justice, and reconciliation: Judging the fairness of amnesty in South Africa’ 
(00) :  AJPS -. It has been observed that ‘[a]dvocates of restorative jus-
tice (RJ) hypothesize that the diversion of criminal cases to RJ conferences should 
be more effective in lowering the rate of reoffending than traditional prosecution 
in court processing because the conferences more effectively engage the psycho-
logical mechanisms of reintergrative shaming and procedural justice.’ See TR Tyler 
et al ‘Reintegrative shaming, procedural justice, and recidivism: The engagement 
of offenders’ psychological mechanisms in the Canbella rise drinking-and-driving 
experiment’ (007) 1 Law & Soc’y Rev . It has been argued that ‘…victim par-
ticipation contract[s] some of the basic principles of restorative justice…that is to 
say, crime victims demand…increased penal sanctions along with other potentially 
repressive measures such as sexual offender registration, impinging on the rights 
of criminal offenders.’ See V Barker, ‘The politics of pain: A political institutional-
ist analysis of crime victims’ moral protests’ (007) 1 Law & Soc’y Rev . It has 
been suggested that ‘[a] recent entry into the field of punishment, restorative justice, 
emphasizes cooperation between victim and offender in repairing the harm that has 
occurred to both.’ See RR French, ‘The Dalai Lama speaks on law’ (007)  Buff L 
Rev 7. For the challenges associated with restorative justice, see M Zernova, ‘Aspi-
rations of restorative justice proponents and experiences of participants in family 
group conferences’ (007) 7 Brit J Criminology 91-09.
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objectives of punishment in some jurisdictions, including South Africa. 
Researchers in KwaZulu-Natal have indicated that South Africa’s De-
partment of Correctional Services’ officials are supportive of both rec-
onciliation and restorative justice and they (the officials) propose that 
if implemented, reconciliation and restorative justice would address the 
problems of overcrowding and recidivism in South Africa. However, 
Bezuidenhout has argued that much as restorative justice is increas-
ingly being advocated in South Africa, ‘there is no consensus amongst 
scholars regarding’ its definition and meaning. This is supported by 
the interviews carried out among magistrates and prosecutors in South 
Africa. Although they supported restorative justice, the researchers 
found that ‘there were many misconceptions and uncertainties about 
various points of restorative justice’, and thus many of them needed 
to be ‘properly trained about the objectives and effectiveness of re-
storative justice...’. Hargovan has suggested that much as restorative 
justice may be good for South Africa, and some mechanisms akin to 
present day models of restorative justice have been implemented by 
some South African communities for generations, it would be unsuit-
able for South Africa to just transplant restorative justice models from 
other parts of the world into the South African criminal justice system 
because they might not be effective. He therefore proposes that ‘[m]ore 
research is necessary into the relevance of various models and practice 
for South Africa.’7
Simply stated, retribution takes a backward-looking approach to 
punishment. The offender is punished because he broke the law and 
he deserves to be punished for that.8 Rabie and Strauss are of the 
view that retribution is the only justifiable theory of punishment, in 
 See Department of Correctional Services White Paper on Corrections in South Africa 
(00) paras ..7; .; and .1..
 PJ Potgieter et al ‘Correctional officers’ perception of restorative justice’ (00) 18 
Acta Criminologica 0-.
 C Bezuidenhout ‘Restorative justice with an explicit rehabilitative ethos: Is this the 
resolve to change criminality?’ (007) 0: Acta Criminologica . For his definition 
of restorative justice see .
 J Prinsloo et al ‘Views of the Judiciary on Certain Elements of Restorative Justice’ 
(00) 1 Acta Criminologica .
7 H Hargovan ‘Restorative Justice: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow — Making Sense of 
Shifting Perspectives in Crime Control and Criminal Justice in South Africa’ (007) 0 
Acta Criminologica 88.
8 It has been observed that retribution aims at giving the convicted criminal ‘his just 
deserts proportionate to the harms he inflicted…’ See MA Drumbl ‘The Expressive 
Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, The Geneva Conventions, 
and International Criminal Law’ (007) 7 Geo Wash L Rev 1170. It has been sug-
gested that ‘[t]he proportionality theory of punishment considers retribution or just 
deserts for the offender.’ See A Jayaratnam, ‘Prosecuting Stock-Option Backdating: 
The Ethics of Enforcement Techniques’ (007) 0 Geo J Legal Ethics 71.
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the sense that a person is punished not for any other reason but for 
breaking the law.9
Deterrence, on the other hand, suggests that punishment should 
serve the purpose of deterring both the offender and the general 
public from committing crimes.0 In other words, it has a forward-
looking approach to punishment. Deterrence is generally divided 
into two branches: specific and general deterrence (the South African 
Law Commission uses the words ‘direct prevention’ or ‘individual pre-
vention’ and ‘indirect prevention’ or ‘general prevention’ for specific 
and general deterrence respectively).1 The aim of specific deter-
rence is to deter ‘the offender from committing future crimes’ and 
that of general deterrence is to deter ‘others in society from commit-
ting future crimes.’ Specific deterrence is achieved, for example, 
by incarcerating the offender (incapacitation) and thus preventing 
him from offending, because he is removed from society during his 
imprisonment and society is protected against him. On the other 
hand, the aim of general deterrence is to protect society by severely 
punishing the offender so that potential criminals ‘learn a lesson’ and 
avoid committing crime. Thus crime is prevented and society is pro-
tected. Both retribution and deterrence have been criticised widely. 
9 MA Rabie and SA Strauss Punishment: An Introduction to Principles ed (199) -
. For the various understandings of retribution by South African courts and authors 
see SS Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in South Africa ed (007) 1-71.
0 It has been observed that ‘[p]unishment as deterrence presupposes a prior crime that 
was punished, to serve as an example of what is in store for criminals…’ See J Brit-
tana and RA Posner ‘Classic Revised: Penal Theory in Paradise Lost’ (007) 10 Mich L 
Rev 10. It has been argued that in answering the question whether punishment will 
serve a deterrent objective, one needs to ask two further questions: the first question 
is, whether punishment will deter the criminal on whom it has been inflicted from 
committing further crimes; and secondly, whether punishment will deter others, simi-
larly placed as the criminal who has been punished, from committing crime. If the 
answer to both the questions is ‘yes’, then such punishment is just. But if the answer 
is ‘no’, then punishment is not just and should not be inflicted. See L Goodmark, ‘The 
Punishment of Dixie Shanahan: Is There Justice for Battered Women Who Kill?’ (007) 
 U Kan L Rev 09-01. 
1 South African Law Commission, Discussion Paper 91 (Project 8) Sentencing ( A New 
Sentencing Framework) (000) Appendix A, Part 1, Extracts from Issue Paper on 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Chapter , paras . and .10-.1.
 RL Christopher ‘Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment’ (00) 9 
Nw U L Rev 8.
 Rabie and Strauss op cit (n9) refer to specific deterrence as ‘individual prevention’ 
and suggest that it can be achieved through the following ways: incapacitation, reha-
bilitation, and social defence. See -.
 Rabie and Strauss op cit (n9) refer to general deterrence as ‘general prevention’, and 
suggest that it can be achieved in the following ways: general deterrence, socializa-
tion, rehabilitation, reform, and moral sustaining. See -.
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Retribution has been equated with revenge, whereas deterrence has 
been criticised for justifying the punishing of innocent people.
It is beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed analysis of re-
storative justice, deterrence and retribution as objectives of punishment. 
However, it should be mentioned that the Constitutional Court in the 
Makwanyane case recognised ‘deterrence, prevention, reformation, and 
retribution’ to be ‘the main objects of punishment.’7 Furthermore, in the 
defamation case, David Dikoko v Thupa Zacharia Mokhatla, the Consti-
tutional Court pointed out that restorative justice was an ‘emerging idea’ 
in South Africa’s ‘sentencing laws’ founded on ‘deep respect for human-
ity of one another’, that is, ‘ubuntu or botho’,8 and noted that ‘ubuntu 
— botho is highly consonant with rapidly evolving international notions 
of restorative justice.’9 Before embarking on a detailed discussion of 
rehabilitation, we should remind ourselves of the fact that the Nkomo 
decision was not the first one in which the Supreme Court of Appeal 
cast doubt on the possibility of prisoners serving life sentences being re-
habilitated. In S v Sikhipha,0 in which the appellant, 1, was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for raping a 1-year-old girl, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, in reducing the sentence to 0 years’ imprisonment, held that 
one of the factors in mitigation was that the appellant was ‘capable of re-
habilitation.’1 Most importantly, the Court observed that ‘[t]he sentence 
of life imprisonment required by the Legislature is the most serious 
 It has been suggested that ‘…there is no doubt that retribution is revenge, both histor-
ically and conceptually.’ See A Oldenquist, ‘Retribution and the Death Penalty’ (00) 
9 U Dayton L Rev 9. It has been observed that ‘[r]etribution is revenge plain and 
simple. We punish offenders who violate the law because we are angry and want to 
get even. Retribution is about power. It is about force. It is about repression. Under 
this theory, the offender’s violation of the law legitimates our vengeful punishment 
and absolves us of any injustice or transgression we may commit upon her because 
the offender deserves some suffering for violating the social order.’ See RL Nygaard 
‘Crime, Pain, and Punishment’ (1998) 10 Dick L Rev . 
 It has been mentioned that ‘[i]t is an old move in the debate between consequential-
ists and deontologists for the latter to point out that the former would find nothing 
morally wrong with punishing an innocent person under circumstances in which it 
was clear that the benefits to society would outweigh the costs.’ See CS Steiker ‘No, 
Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death 
Penalty’ (00) 8 Stan L Rev 77. It has been suggested further that ‘…for example, 
in situations where a particular type of crime that is extremely difficult to detect is 
causing a lot of damage, a well-publicized punishment is considered a reliable device 
to induce deterrence, and the difficulty of detection is so extreme that no one has 
been apprehended for the crime, the utilitarian theory may justify punishing an inno-
cent person with an extreme sanction.’ See Y Lee, ‘The Constitutional Right Against 
Excessive Punishment’ (00) 91 Va L Rev 70. 
7 S v Makwanyane supra (n1) at para . Footnotes omitted.
8 David Dikoko v Thupa Zacharia Mokhatla 007 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 8.
9 David Dikoko v Thupa Zacharia Mokhatla supra (n) at para 11.
0 S v Sikhipha 00 () SACR 9 (SCA).
1 Sikhipha op cit (n0) at para 18.
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that can be imposed. It effectively denies the appellant the possibility 
of rehabilitation.’ Perhaps to avoid being criticised for relying on the 
possibility of rehabilitation as one of the mitigating factors, the Court 
was quick to add that ‘...the mitigating factors [including the prospect 
of rehabilitation] are not speculative and flimsy.’Can one say that the 
prospect of rehabilitation does not fall in the ambit of speculative and 
flimsy factors?
4.2.1 The meaning of rehabilitation
Rehabilitation as an objective of punishment has a long history dating back 
to the Enlightenment period in Europe. Rehabilitation has also been 
part of the South African criminal justice system for decades. However, 
a discussion of its history is beyond the scope of this article. Whereas the 
Supreme Court of Appeal considers the prospect of rehabilitation to be 
a substantial and compelling circumstance, it does not explain or define 
what it means by ‘rehabilitation.’ Although the word rehabilitation is 
used at least on one occasion in relation to prisoners in the Correctional 
Services Act of 1998,7 no attempt is made to define it.8 Rehabilitation is 
 Sikhipha supra (n0) at para 19. Emphasis mine.
 Sikhipha supra (n0) at para 19. With regard to other mitigating factors, the Court 
observed that ‘[f]actors in mitigation include the fact that the appellant is a first 
offender; that he has a wife and children dependent upon him; that he has a trade 
(he is a bricklayer) and makes a living from his work; that he was 1 years old at the 
time of the trial, and that he is capable of rehabilitation. Moreover, the complainant 
was not seriously injured.’ Pararaph 18.
 See generally MD Dubber ‘The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in 
Modern Penal Thought’ (1998) 1 LHR 11-.
 In 191, for example, Gardiner J of the Cape Provincial Division emphasized the 
importance of rehabilitation as the aim of punishment for juvenile offenders. See Rex 
v Hlatse [191] CPD 1. 
 It is the same with the International Criminal Court Statute. It has been suggested that 
‘[a]lthough there is scope for the individual rehabilitation of offenders to be accom-
modated within the ambit of sentence individualisation permitted under Article 78(1) 
[of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court] by implication, there is no 
attempt made to define the possible meaning of rehabilitation in the wider context of 
international trials, or explain the nature of the values and attitudes that underpin it.’ 
See R Henham ‘Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court’ (00) 
 ICLQ 89. 
7 Act 111 of 1998.
8 Under s 18(1) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, ‘[e]very prisoner must be 
allowed access to available reading material of his or her choice, unless such material 
constitutes a security risk or is not conducive for his or her rehabilitation.’ Rehabilita-
tion was also not defined in the 199 Correctional Services Act (which was repealed 
by the 1998 Correctional Services Act). See GJ Lidovho ‘An Assessment of the Feasi-
bility and Efficacy of Rehabilitation of Offenders Sentenced to Imprisonment as Laid 
Down in the Correctional Services Act 8 of 199’ (00)  Stell LR 17. 
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probably easier to describe than to define.9 This is exactly what the 00 
White Paper on Corrections in South Africa does. It states that:
‘Rehabilitation is the result of a process that combines the correction of 
offending behaviour, human development and the promotion of social 
responsibility and values. It is a desired outcome of processes that involve 
both departmental responsibilities of Government and social responsibili-
ties of the nation. Rehabilitation should be viewed not merely as a strat-
egy to preventing crime, but rather as a holistic phenomenon incorporating 
and encouraging: social responsibility; social justice; active participation in 
domestic activities; empowering with life-skills and other skills; and a con-
tribution to making South Africa a better place to live in. Rehabilitation is 
achieved through the delivery of key services to offenders, including both 
correction of the offending behaviour and the development of the human 
being involved. The correction of offending behaviour and development are 
two separate, but linked responsibilities. Rehabilitation is achieved through 
interventions to change attitudes, behaviour and social circumstances. The 
desired outcome is rehabilitation and the promotion of social values and 
responsibility.’0
From the above description we can extract the following as the fea-
tures of rehabilitation: rehabilitation is the initiative(s) taken by the 
prison authorities to model the offender’s life during his time in prison 
in such a way that when he is released from prison, either on parole 
or after serving his full sentence, he has been reformed to such an 
extent that he is not likely to re-offend; and that the said initiatives 
could include various programmes that are implemented in a manner 
which ensures that the prisoner is reformed holistically.1 Thus, the 
Correctional Services Act indirectly recognises this point by provid-
ing, in s , that ‘...the implementation of a sentence of imprisonment 
has the objective of enabling the sentenced prisoner to lead a socially 
9 It has been illustrated in the United States that ‘[w]hile most juvenile court practition-
ers agree the purpose of the system is rehabilitative, there is lack of consensus on the 
meaning of rehabilitation.’ See VI Vieth ‘When the Child Abuser is a Child: Investigat-
ing, Prosecuting and Treating Juvenile Sex Offenders in the New Millennium’ (001) 
 Hamline L Rev 9. 
0 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) paras ..1-..
1 For the rehabilitation programmes being implemented in prisons and corrections 
see Department of Correctional Services Annual Report for the 2006/2007 Financial 
Year 1-. It has been suggested that ‘[t]he essence of rehabilitation is to bring about 
positive change in offenders and their fundamental behaviour. This means that the 
disposition, attitude and behaviour of the individual must be changed.’ See C Cilliers 
and J Smit ‘Offender Rehabilitation in the South African Correctional System: Myth or 
Realty?’ (007) 0 Acta Criminologica 8. 
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responsible and crime-free life in the future.’ The White Paper on 
Corrections recognises that
‘rehabilitation is best facilitated through a holistic sentence planning proc-
ess that engages the offenders at all levels – social, moral, spiritual, physical, 
work, educational/intellectual and mental. It is premised on the approach 
that every human being is capable of change and transformation if offered 
the opportunity and resources.’
It thus makes it compulsory for prisoners to participate in rehabilita-
tion programmes.
The Correctional Services Act enumerates the manner in which the 
above objectives will be achieved by requiring a sentenced prisoner 
to participate in various programmes and activities. The Act also 
provides for the custody of prisoners under humane conditions, and 
this could be interpreted to mean that such a step is meant to ensure 
that prisoners are detained in conditions that facilitate their rehabilita-
tion. Community corrections are also implemented to facilitate the 
rehabilitation and re-integration of the offenders.7 So are the parole 
 It has been stated that ‘[s]ection  of the Correctional Services Act defines the pur-
pose of imprisonment: after having due regard that the deprivation of liberty serves 
the purposes of punishment, the purpose of a term of imprisonment is to enable the 
sentenced prisoner “to lead a socially responsible and crime-free-life in the future’. 
It is in this formulation that the constitutional justification for the rights limitations 
imposed on sentenced prisoners is found.’ See L Muntingh, Prisons in South Africa’s 
Constitutional Democracy (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Crim-
inal Justice Programme) (007) 8 available at http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/correctio-
nal/prisonsinsa.pdf, accessed on 1 February 008. Emphasis in original. Footnotes 
omitted.
 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) at para ... The White Paper lists 
various government departments that the Department of Correctional Services has to 
work with to holistically rehabilitate offenders. At paras .. and ...
 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) at para ..1. This is probably done 
to avoid the happening in South Africa of the situation, with regard to which one 
scholar has observed that ‘[u]nlike mandatory programs in the early penitentiary sys-
tem, participation [in rehabilitation programs] is usually optional; indeed, in many 
prisons, education, drug treatment, job training, and work are privileges for which 
prisoners must seek approval. Like “good time,” participation in rehabilitation pro-
grams is conceived of as an optional benefit conferred upon offenders rather than 
an obligation that offenders owe their victims, families, communities, or society at 
large.’ See D Braman ‘Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming 
Criminal Sanctions in America’ (00)  UCLA L Rev 1180. 
 Section 7 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998.
 Chapter III of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. Cilliers and Smit op cit (n1) 
8, agree that rehabilitation cannot take place ‘without first providing inmates with 
conditions that are consistent with human dignity.’ 
7 Chapter VI of the Correctional Services Act. Rabie and Strauss op cit (n9) 1, are of 
the view that ‘successful rehabilitation can take place only within the community and 
not in isolation thereof.’ 
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procedures and conditions.8 After describing what rehabilitation is in 
the South African context, one needs to look at the problems associated 
with it so as to highlight the likely challenges if its prospect were to be 
mainstreamed as one of the substantial and compelling circumstances 
enabling courts to depart from imposing life sentences.
4.2.2 Challenges
Rehabilitation is influenced largely by speculation that the offender, 
after undergoing the various training and attending the relevant courses 
in prison, will lead a crime-free life.9 This is clear in the language of 
the White Paper on Corrections when it uses phrases such as ‘rehabili-
tation is achieved through interventions to change attitudes, behaviour 
and social circumstances’. Thus, for the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
invoke the prospect of rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling 
circumstance, it is stipulating that the offender will be rehabilitated by 
serving a shorter prison term other than life imprisonment. The Court 
is also invoking ‘undue sympathy’ towards the offender in the sense 
that it thinks that life imprisonment may be a very severe punishment 
for him, and that is why it opts to impose a lesser sentence.
Related to the above are the following two issues: funding for the re-
habilitation programmes that do exist in prisons; and, the achievements 
that the Department of Correctional Services has registered over time 
with regard to rehabilitation. Whereas the Department of Correctional 
Services has a huge budget for the years 007-010,0 it has been il-
lustrated that this budget has been declining in real and relative values 
over the past few years, and that the Department has also been unable 
to meet its rehabilitation targets.1 These two factors have affected the 
8 Chapter VII of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. It has been observed in rela-
tion to the United States that ‘[t]he relationship between rehabilitation and parole is 
deeply imbedded in the law…In its opinion in Campbell County, the Supreme Court 
said that rehabilitation programs are “intrinsically beneficial and extrinsically essen-
tial to parole considerations”.’ See RG Lawson ‘Turning Jails into Prisons — Collateral 
Damage from Kentucky’s “War on Crime” (00-007) 9 Ky L J . Footnotes omit-
ted.
9 It has been rightly put that ‘the theory of rehabilitation implies that we know how to 
rehabilitate offenders and that facilities exist for the treatment of offenders.’ See Rabie 
and Strauss op cit (n9) 0.
0 Approximately R10.7 billion. See Budget 2007-National Medium Term Expenditure 
Estimates Vote 19 (Correctional Services) 7, available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/ 
accessed on  October 007. 
1 L Muntingh, ‘Correctional Services Budget 007/08 to 009/10’ Civil Society Prison 
Reform Initiative Newsletter, No. 1, March 007, available at http://www.communi-
tylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Civil-Society-Prison-Reform/newsletter/cspri-newsletter/
archive-of-cspri-newsletter/CSPRI%20Newsletter%2021 accessed on  October 007.
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Department as a whole including its rehabilitation programmes, 
and thus strengthens the argument that the prospect of rehabilitation 
remains a speculative hypothesis. As Muntingh states succinctly:
Indicative of the difficulties in spending on rehabilitation and reintegration 
is the fact that the DCS planned in 00/ to have % of all offenders 
assessed in respect of their risk profile, a prerequisite for the development 
of a sentence plan that would assist in their rehabilitation. This target was 
not met and risk profiling will now begin in 007/8 after the necessary tools 
have been approved. Similarly the Department set itself a target of 0 000 
inside work opportunities for sentenced prisoners in 00/, but only 00 
opportunities were realised. The challenge emerging from this is not one of 
lack of funds, but rather of how to effect spending on the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of prisoners. The Corrections Programme budget makes spe-
cific mention of the new programmes developed and planned in line with 
the White Paper but the amounts involved are small and comprise less than 
% of the programme budget. One is therefore left with the impression that 
allocations aimed at implementing rehabilitation and reintegration are not 
strongly articulated in the budget vote.’
The question that arises is whether the Supreme Court of Appeal will 
ensure that those people it has sent to prison to be rehabilitated indeed 
get rehabilitated despite the declining financial status of the Depart-
ment and its failure to meet its rehabilitation targets. If the Court is 
of the view that the Department has the capacity to rehabilitate of-
fenders when they are in a prison serving sentences other than life 
imprisonment, why does it hold the view that the Department does not 
have the capacity to rehabilitate prisoners serving life sentences? This 
could be attributed to the fact that the Department lacks rehabilitation 
programmes specifically designed for people serving life sentences ir-
respective of the fact that the number in that category of prisoners is 
growing rapidly.
 This problem is not unique to South Africa. It has been observed in relation to the 
United States that ‘[p]rison rehabilitation programs, where they even exist, are often 
under-funded and given low priority, frequently resulting in ineffective treatments for 
inmates…’ See SM LeBlanc ‘Cruelty to the Mentally Ill: An Eighth Amendment Chal-
lenge to the Abolition of the Insanity Defense’ (007)  Am U L Rev 119. In Cali-
fornia, recently, the Governor ‘announced his intention to cut $9 million worth of 
inmate rehabilitation programs…’ but proposed adding new employees and increased 
spending on corrections. See C Fiebig ‘Legislating from the Bench: Judicial Activism 
in California and its Increasing Impact on Adult Prison Reform’ (007)  Stan J Civ Rts 
& Civ Liberties 1.
 Muntingh op cit (n 1).
 Personal interview with senior Department of Correctional Services officials,  Sep-
tember 007 (National Parliament, Old Chambers Assembly, Cape Town, at public 
hearings on the Correctional Services Amendment Bill). In its 2006/2007 Annual 
Report, the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons indicates that most prisons in South Africa 
lack rehabilitation programmes, and as a result most prisoners spend  hours a day 
in their cells. See 1-. 
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As pointed out earlier, Theron AJA observed in her dissenting judge-
ment in Nkomo that there is no person of whom it can be said that he 
is incapable of rehabilitation. This view, as already mentioned, is also 
supported by the White Paper on Corrections which states that ‘every 
human being is capable of change and transformation if offered the 
opportunity and resources.’ However, judges of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal have adopted the position that some offenders are incapable 
of rehabilitation. This position has support from certain academic 
circles.7 What this means is that the Supreme Court of Appeal appears 
to reason that offenders who are capable of rehabilitation should not 
be sentenced to life imprisonment, and, by implication, that life impris-
onment should be reserved for those incapable of rehabilitation. By 
suggesting that some prisoners cannot be rehabilitated, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal is not only casting doubt on the ability of the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services to rehabilitate all prisoners, but it also 
indirectly suggesting that the prison environment in South Africa is 
not conducive to rehabilitating offenders. The Court is probably taking 
cognisance of the fact that, as illustrated by the two studies referred to 
above, the number of prisoners serving life imprisonment is skyrocket-
ing, and that many prisons are overcrowded and not conducive for re-
habilitation purposes, especially for prisoners serving life sentences.8 
The Court could also be aware that many South African prisons, as 
the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons pointed out, are characterised by 
 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) para ...
 In Boy v S [1999] JOL 9 (A) in which the accuseds, who were prisoners serving life 
sentences, killed their fellow inmate by strangulation, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in sentencing them to life imprisonment held that they were ‘irretrievably beyond any 
possibility of rehabilitation.’ 
7 Parker, for example, is of the view that ‘[i]t would be silly to suggest that all offend-
ers are capable of reform, but does this mean we should conclude that no criminal 
offenders are capable of it?...[the] penal system should promote rehabilitation and 
give the criminal offenders the opportunity while incarcerated to make their own 
efforts to reform, which can then ultimately lead to renewal.’ See L Parker ‘Penal 
Reform and the Necessity for Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (007) 0 Geo J Legal Ethics 
87. 
8 It has been reported that ‘[d]espite the overall reduction in prison numbers, there 
are numerous prisons that are still badly overcrowded. While 7 prisons [of the 0 
prisons in South Africa] had less than 100% occupation, 11 exceeded 100% with 7 
having more than 10% including 8 with more than 17%.’ See Annual Report of 
the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons 2005-2006 at para 7.. In its 2006/2007 Annual 
Report, the Department of Correctional Services also notes that overcrowding is a 
serious problem in prisons, see op cit (n1) 0. For the latest challenges resulting 
from overcrowding also see Annual Report of the Office of the Judicial Inspectorate of 
Prisons 2006/2007 op cit (n) 11.
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gangs whose activities are not favourable to rehabilitation activities.9 
Peacock and Theron concluded that ‘[g]ang activities permeate almost 
every sphere of prison life in South Africa.’70 One could also argue 
that, by sentencing offenders to life imprisonment, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal believes that because of the offences they have committed, 
their personal characteristics and the circumstances under which they 
committed the offences, it would take them time to be rehabilitated, 
and that that is why they should be kept in prison for longer. If this 
were the view, one would have to assess it in light of what the Consti-
tutional Court said in the Dodo case: that it would be a violation of the 
offender’s right to human dignity were he to be sentenced to a lengthy 
period of time in prison for reformative purposes.71
By ruling that offenders should not be sentenced to life imprison-
ment because life imprisonment will deny them the opportunity to be 
rehabilitated, the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to be adopting an 
understanding of the purpose of prison sentences that is different from 
that stipulated in the White Paper on Corrections (the separation of 
powers issue that may arise here is discussed below). The White Paper 
provides that ‘rehabilitation needs to be understood in the courts, by 
those sentenced and by the correctional officials as the key reason for 
sentencing.’7 This should ordinarily include life sentences.
One important issue that requires discussion, however briefly, relates 
to the question of separation of powers. In addressing this issue we 
need to ask ourselves one question and answer it honestly and directly: 
should courts be reasonably expected to look at the White Paper on 
Corrections to inform their understanding of rehabilitation? Put dif-
ferently, would not the principle of separation of powers be violated 
9 ‘It is common cause that many prisoners do not accept the authority of correctional 
officials nor do they necessarily obey lawful instructions. The best examples of these 
are the involvement of many prisoners in prison gangs, gang assaults, and the smug-
gling of contraband. Based on our observations and the reports of Independent Pris-
ons Visitors (IPVs), these acts of defiance are common to most prisons…The JIOP 
receives daily reports and complaints from prisoners and their families of assaults 
and intimidation by …prison gangs.’ Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of 
Prisons 2006/2007 op cit () 1.
70 R Peacock and A Theron ‘Identity Development of the Incarcerated Adolescent with 
Particular Reference to Prison Gang Membership’ (007) 0 Acta Criminoligica . 
For a discussion of how some gangs formed in prison affect communities outside 
prison see, BE van Wyk and WH Theron ‘Fighting Gangsterism in South Africa: A 
Contextual Review of Gang and Anti-Gang Movements in the Western Cape’ (00) 
18 Acta Criminologica 1- 0. 
71 Dodo supra (n) para 8. It has been stated that ‘[South Africa’s] traditional prisons 
are not…ideally suited to the task of rehabilitation, although valuable work is done 
there by inter alia social workers, clinical psychiatrists, educationists and clergymen’ 
See Rabie and Strauss op cit (n9) 0-1.
7 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) para ..1.
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if courts were expected to refer to a document of the Executive or a 
government policy, in this case the White Paper on Corrections, to 
establish what does or does not amount to rehabilitation? That is not 
an easy question to answer. It needs an understanding of what is meant 
by the principle of separation of powers in the South African context.
The principle of separation of powers is expressly provided for as 
Constitutional Principle VI, which requires that there shall be separa-
tion of powers between the three arms of government, that is, the 
executive, the judiciary and the legislature, but that there have to be 
‘appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsive-
ness and openness.’7 The Constitutional Court held in the Dodo case 
that ‘[t]here is under our Constitution no absolute separation of powers 
between the judicial function, on the one hand, and the legislature and 
the executive on the other’,7 and that ‘[w]hen the nature and process 
of punishment is considered in its totality, it is apparent that all three 
branches of the state play a functional role and must necessarily do 
so.’7 It thus follows, that when courts impose sentences, they should 
do so in a manner that does not seek to eliminate the role of the execu-
tive in the sentencing process and outcome unless it is clear that by so 
doing, that is by accommodating the role of the executive, courts will 
be violating the Constitution. The Constitutional Court adds that the 
executive and legislature ‘have a general interest in sentencing policy, 
penology and the extent to which correctional institutions are used to 
further the various objectives of punishment’,7 rehabilitation being 
one of them.
The extent to which the judiciary should allow the executive or 
the legislature to influence its sentencing policy, but within the ambit 
of the Constitution, is ‘incapable of comprehensive abstract formula-
tion, but must be decided as specific challenges arise.’77 The specific 
challenge which has arisen, and needs to be dealt with, relates to 
the extent to which courts can rely on the definition or description 
of rehabilitation in the White Paper on Corrections to inform their 
approach with respect to rehabilitation. In the light of the above 
discussion, the author argues that it would not amount to a violation 
of the principle of separation of powers if courts referred to the 
White Paper on Corrections for guidance on what amounts to reha-
bilitation in the South African context. This is because it is through 
the White Paper on Corrections that the Executive communicates to 
the judiciary what it thinks rehabilitation should mean, and unless 
7 Dodo supra (n) at para 1.
7 Dodo supra (n) at para . 
7 Ibid.
7 Dodo supra (n) at para . Footnotes omitted.
77 Dodo supra (n) at para .
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by adopting that understanding of rehabilitation the courts will be 
violating the Constitution, there is no reason why they should not do 
so. Otherwise courts could develop an understanding of rehabilita-
tion which is not in line with the executive’s, and the result would 
be, as happened in the Nkomo case, that the court will consider the 
role of punishment (in this case rehabilitation) in a manner opposed 
to that of the executive.
We have to recall that there are at least two occasions when the 
Constitutional Court referred to White Papers in its decisions, which 
supports our view that courts can refer to the White Paper on Cor-
rections. In Die Oranje Vrystaatse Vereniging vir Staatsondersteunde 
Skole Dimakatso Ann Nkiane v Die Premier van die Provinsie Vrystaat 
the White Paper on Education was referred to in a case where the ap-
plicants challenged the Province’s policy of ‘terminating bursaries and 
transport subsidies for pupils attending what were known as “state-
aided-schools”.’78 Recently, and most importantly, in M v S (Centre for 
Child Law Amicus Curiae), the Constitutional Court expressly relied on 
the White Paper for Social Welfare, which emphasises the importance 
of the family in society and in the upbringing of children, to hold that 
‘the importance of maintaining the integrity of family care’ is one of 
the factors that must be considered by the sentencing court, especially 
where the convicted person is the primary caregiver.79
5.  Philosophy challenged by human rights in the 
rehabilitation debate
From a philosophical point of view, one of the criticisms of rehabilita-
tion is that it is based on the assumption that ‘offenders are “sick” 
and in need of treatment to cure their sickness.’80 Rabie and Strauss 
point out that rehabilitation regards the offender ‘as a social malfunc-
tioner who should be “treated”, rather than blamed.’81 This means, 
the argument goes, that the judge, the parole board, and the prison 
authorities are justified to detain the offender as long as it takes for 
him to be cured of his sickness. Hence rehabilitation has supported 
indeterminate incarceration.8 One could argue that in South Africa 
detaining a person indefinitely until he is rehabilitated is impossible 
because, as I have illustrated above, the Constitutional Court held in 
78 Die Oranje Vrystaatse Vereniging vir Staatsondersteunde Skole Dimakstso Ann Nki-
ane v Die Premier van die Provinsie Vrystaat 1998 () SA 9 at para 1.
79 M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae) 007(1) BCLR 11(CC) at para 8.
80 J Brooks ‘Addressing Recidivism: Legal Education in Correctional Settings’ (199)  
Rutgers L Rev 71.
81 Rabie and Strauss op cit (n9) 9.
8 Brooks op cit (n80) 71-.
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Dodo that a sentence of imprisonment, which would require a pris-
oner to be detained for a lengthy period for rehabilitative purposes 
without taking into consideration the gravity of the offence committed, 
is unconstitutional in that it violates his right to human dignity. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has also held that prisoners should have the 
prospect of being released, otherwise a punishment that would require 
a prisoner to spend the rest of his life in prison is cruel, inhuman and 
degrading.8 The White Paper on Corrections also stipulates that one 
of the purposes of rehabilitation is ‘to make offenders aware of what 
society anticipates them to learn through the rehabilitation process and 
to put back into society once they have completed their sentence.’8 In 
addition, the philosophical argument that rehabilitation programmes 
are adopted because the authorities think that the offender is sick and 
also in need of treatment, appears to have no basis in South Africa. This 
is so because the White Paper on Corrections looks at rehabilitation 
not as treatment, but rather as correction and development.8
6. Conclusion
Unless a comprehensive study were carried out to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness on prisoners of the rehabilitation programmes being im-
plemented by the Department of Correctional Services,8 the prospect 
of rehabilitation remains highly speculative, and there is indeed no 
guarantee that some of the prisoners sentenced to prison terms other 
than life imprisonment will be rehabilitated. The White Paper acknowl-
edges that
‘to achieve rehabilitation, serious study is needed into the ...rehabilitative 
effects of various alternative sentences in order to develop, as an integrated 
justice system, guidelines to assist the judiciary in sentencing convicted indi-
viduals.’87
The United States example is illustrative. It has been observed in the 
United States, in relation to rehabilitation programmes for men who 
have been found guilty of domestic-violence-related offences, that, in 
the hope of rehabilitating them, initiatives such as
8 Nkosi v State [00] JOL 1009 (SCA).
8 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) para ...
8 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) para .1..
8 In the United States, it has been pointed out that ‘…a comprehensive 1998 report 
to Congress funded by the National Institute of Justice reviewed all of the relevant 
research conducted since the mid-1980s, and concluded that rehabilitation programs 
can indeed effectively change offenders.’ See RK Warren ‘Evidence-Based Practices 
and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism’ (007) 8 
Ind L J 108. 
87 Department of Correctional Services op cit (n) para .1..
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‘attitude change and improved behavioral skills such as anger management 
[have been adopted. However, the problem is that] Despite the prevalence 
of these initiatives, insufficient research has assessed their effectiveness and 
findings are inconclusive. Some studies have found no differences in attitudes 
toward domestic violence and recidivism rates between men in treatment 
programs and those on probation. Other research finds lower recidivism 
among men who completed the treatment program. However, the signifi-
cance of these results is often compromised by high drop-out rates and non-
random assignment systems that screen out men with low motivation.’88
The Supreme Court of Appeal will need to set the record straight by 
either explaining what it meant for the prospect of rehabilitation to 
be one of the substantial and compelling circumstances, or to revisit 
its ruling in the Malgas case and explain what it meant by speculative 
hypotheses and undue sympathy to the offender as factors that should 
be excluded from the composite yardstick of what amounts to substan-
tial and compelling circumstances. The Court will also need to develop 
criteria that should be used to gauge whether a particular offender is 
capable of rehabilitation or not, so that the lower courts can be able to 
follow the Court’s reasoning without much confusion. Otherwise, one 
is left with no option but to conclude that the majority ruling in the 
Nkomo case has paved the way for future confusing interpretations of 
what amounts to substantial and compelling circumstances, which we 
had hoped had been ‘finally’ settled in Malgas.
88 DL Rhode ‘Social Research and Social Change: Meeting the Challenges of Gender 
Inequality and Sexual Abuse’ (007) 0 Harv J L & Gender 0-1.
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